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INTRODUCTION 
The history-defining current U.S. federal policy on the 
enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses or contracts 
is characterized principally by (i) Congress passing the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) in 19251 and (ii) a series of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions perpetually harkening back to the FAA and leading to the 
recent Epic Systems decision.2 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
enforcing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration has grown from early 
policy justification emphasizing the FAA directive to treat arbitration 
contracts like all contracts in reversing the prior disfavor of arbitration 
to the now seemingly incontestable defense of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in myriad form and context.3 Perhaps the most impactful 
step along the way was the Court’s setting out of the separability 
doctrine—viewing arbitration provisions included in larger contracts 
as though those clauses are independent contracts themselves.4 More 
recently, the Court’s impact has been forceful in declining to alter its 
jurisprudence when confronted with the impracticable consequences 
that class arbitration waivers have on consumer and small business 
claimants—disregarding the effective vindication doctrine, or the 
financial illogic of proceeding on a de minimis solo claim that 
similarly affects many others and is likely consequential only in the 
 
 1. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018).  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.  
Id. § 2. 
 2. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, slip op. 2 (U.S. 2018); see also 
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 15, 22 (1992) (discussing the history of arbitration prior to 
the FAA); G. Richard Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: 
Reflections on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 397, 
399–407 (1998) (summarizing FAA and early Supreme Court interpretations). 
 3. See Shell, supra note 2, at 397 (describing how the Court has liberally 
interpreted the FAA to apply nationally to pre-arbitration clauses).  
 4. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–
04 (1967) (holding that arbitration provisions may be enforced separately from the 
contract at large); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1974) 
(continuing the issue in Prima Paint and distinguishing its prior decision in Wilko v. 
Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).  
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aggregate.5 Yet, even as the Supreme Court has continued to enforce 
mandatory arbitration in the face of challenges to employment 
agreements, consumer finance contracts, and broker-dealer or 
investment agreements, scholarly criticism of the Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence has only grown.6 
This Article responds to the increasingly prolific Supreme Court 
jurisprudence enforcing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
and the growing body of scholarly criticism of that jurisprudence.7 
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court continued its trend of robustly 
enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements in Epic Systems Corp. 
v. Lewis.8 Epic Systems is only the latest decision in a now extensive 
body of Supreme Court precedent denying various challenges to 
mandatory arbitration.9 
 
 5. See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2013). 
 6. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 
2811 (2015) [hereinafter Diffusing Disputes] (pointing out all that is given up in 
procedure, public reviewability, and appeal rights when civil litigation is replaced 
with arbitration); see also Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer 
Finance and Investment Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793, 805–06 (2015) 
(discussing the problems with arbitration agreements in investment contracts); J. 
Maria Glover, Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization: Disappearing Claims 
and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3055 (2015) (identifying at 
least eight principles that have been lost with the shift from trials to settlements); 
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80–81 (2011) [hereinafter 
Fairness in Numbers] (emphasizing due process and fairness concerns with class 
action waivers); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to 
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable 
Abuse, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 102 (2004) (pointing to how defendants and 
the court systems may be undermined by class actions); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the 
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 89, 99 (2001) (considering several factors that go into deciding whether 
judicial decisions in arbitration are good policy). 
 7. Referring to agreements made before disputes have arisen, requiring 
arbitration of disputes, and generally precluding any court involvement or review. See 
Fairness in Numbers, supra note 6, at 80 (criticizing the Court’s decisions in several 
major cases on fairness grounds).  
 8. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, slip op. 25 (U.S. 2018) 
(holding that arbitration agreements will be enforced by the Court).  
 9. See infra Part II; see also Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, 
The NLRB v. the Courts: Showdown over the Right to Collective Action in the 
Workplace, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 75, 82–88 (2015) (discussing earlier arbitration 
precedent closely related to the Supreme Court’s Epic Systems consolidated decision); 
Christine Neylon O’Brien, Will the Supreme Court Agree with the NLRB that the Pre-
Dispute Employment Arbitration Provisions Containing Class and Collective Action 
Waivers in Both Judicial and Arbitral Forums Violate the National Labor Relations 
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While many have written critiquing the Supreme Court’s 
consistent support for, if not promotion of, mandatory sole arbitration, 
including the Court’s enforcement of class arbitration waivers, this 
Article offers a new idea.10 Rather than focusing primarily on attacking 
(or supporting) the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this Article 
proposes the volitional implementation of contractually required 
mediation (in no one form) before or in place of mandatory arbitration 
(or litigation).11 It proposes a best practice to nudge bigger businesses 
toward better treatment of consumers and small businesses, suggesting 
that this first step mediation may well work in the favor of bigger 
business as instrumental marketing, even if not adopted for normative 
purposes.12 
Part I discusses the proliferation of mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration in the contexts of employment, consumer finance, and 
broker-dealer agreements, relying on empirical studies.13 Part II seeks 
to distill the current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic and 
offers a chronology of important Supreme Court decisions on 
mandatory arbitration through Epic Systems.14 Part III proposes 
making mediation, rather than mandatory arbitration, a first course of 
action for contractual dispute resolution.15 This proposal of first step 
mediation is to establish a best practice that will nudge the bigger 
businesses that appear to favor mandatory arbitration toward better 
treatment of the individual consumers and small businesses that often 
seem to find mandatory sole arbitration impractical or unjust.16 
Finally, this Article concludes that some version of this mediation 
proposal may be the most plausible way to fairly and justly attempt to 
resolve disputes about or governed by contracts, particularly in light 
of the continued Supreme Court precedent on the topic and the 
commensurate hardening (albeit ineffective) scholarly opposition to 
the Supreme Court. 
 
Act – Whether There Is an Opt-Out or Not?, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 515, 535–41 (2017) 
(setting up key issues heard by the Supreme Court in the Epic Systems case primarily 
in § 7 violations of the NLRA). 
 10. See Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 6, at 102 (describing a critique of 
forced class arbitration). 
 11. See id. (criticizing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the grounds that class 
actions hurt defendants). 
 12. See infra Part III (discussing the merits of mediation as a better practice 
for business). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part II.  
 15. See infra Part III.  
 16. See id. 
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I. THE PROLIFERATION OF MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION 
While certainly not voluminous, a body of empirical work has 
accumulated assessing just how ubiquitous mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses have become and how arbitration claims filed 
pursuant to them actually proceed.17 While the studies do not line up 
perfectly in the categories instrumental in this work, the data does 
enable one to draw basic conclusions in each of the employment, 
consumer finance, and broker-dealer contexts.  
Though varied in exact data and in attention to narrower issues 
of consumer or employee win rates, award amounts, repeat player 
effects, class action bans, and arbitrator bias, among other topics, these 
studies appear to consistently indicate high rates of reliance (generally 
between 35% and upwards of 75% of contracts studied) on mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in each of the employment, consumer 
finance, and broker-dealer fields.18 As further evidence of 
proliferation, the reader might simply consider how many form 
contracts she has entered into in paper or online recently and recall or 
examine how many of them contain pre-dispute arbitration provisions.  
A. Employment 
Several studies have focused on American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) data, the AAA being one of, if not the, primary 
facilitators of commercial arbitration.19 Earlier work examining repeat 
 
 17. See generally, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG LLC, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES (2005) (detailing the results of 
mass arbitration). 
 18. See id.; see also Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical 
Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their 
Rights?, 58 DISP. RESOL. L.J. 56–58 (2003) (taking account the popularity of 
arbitration in employment disputes); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–100 
(1974) (one of the earliest studies concerned with repeat players); David Horton & 
Andrea Cann Chandraskher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer 
Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 76–87 (2015) (discussing and critiquing major studies). 
See generally SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER ARBITRATION (2009) 
(stating the study’s purpose as, “[t]o better understand the issues surrounding 
consumer arbitration and to begin developing a factual record for policy discussion, 
SCJI commissioned a Task Force on Consumer Arbitration”). 
 19. See Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 
18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 777, 792 (2003) (describing that data used was from AAA 
arbitration). 
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player effects in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in the employment 
context undertaken by Lisa Bingham has been enhanced (and 
criticized) in subsequent studies by Elizabeth Hill and Alexander 
Colvin.20 Bingham’s work recognized a strong increase in employer 
use of mandatory arbitration in employment agreements in the early 
1990s and proceeded to look at win rates of repeat player employers 
and repeat player plaintiff’s lawyers.21 Bingham’s focus on the repeat 
player effect stems from Marc Galanter’s prior work really defining 
the repeat player effect.22 Hill cites still more dramatic increases in 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions among employers, 
noting a rate change of mandatory arbitration provisions in 
employment agreements from 19% to 62% during the late 1990s.23 In 
analyzing recently updated related data, Colvin has subsequently 
found that the frequency of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions in employment agreements has more than doubled since 
the early 2000s to a present rate of over 55%.24 
Adding to Bingham, Hill, and Colvin’s analyses of data on 
employment disputes in AAA arbitration is Lamare and Lipsky’s 
study of employment disputes arbitrated via FINRA.25 FINRA 
 
 20. See Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 191 (1997) [hereinafter The Repeat Player Effect] 
(interpreting the data to find less employee success against repeat player employers); 
see also Lisa Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of 
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 223, 235–40 (1998) (finding that repeat employers enjoy more success than non-
repeat employers in employment arbitration); Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical 
Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–20 (2011) (analyzing only AAA employment disputes in 
California); Hill, supra note 19, 792–824 (focusing only on employment disputes). 
 21. See The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 20, at 190, 197–200. 
 22. See Galanter, supra note 18, at 97–114 (elaborating on the “repeat player 
effect,” which describes unique advantages that individuals who “engage[] in many 
similar litigations over time” acquire to the detriment of those “who have only 
occasional recourse to the courts”). 
 23. Hill, supra note 19, at 779–80; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’ EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE 
WORKPLACE, GAO/GGD-97-157, 2 (1997) (reporting that 19% of employers 
surveyed were using arbitration to resolve employment disputes).  
 24. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION: ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION 
AMERICANS 1 (2018). 
 25. J. Ryan Lamare & David B. Lipsky, Employment Arbitration in the 
Securities Industry: Lessons Drawn from Recent Empirical Research, 35 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 113, 118–30 (2014) (presenting evidence of the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) influence over employment arbitration). FINRA 
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arbitration is the broker-dealer industry norm for resolution of disputes 
not only between customers and broker-dealers but also between 
brokers and broker-dealers.26 The latter principally concerns 
employment disputes.27 Virtually all of these disputes are subject to 
FINRA arbitration, which Lamare and Lipsky find to be less biased 
and less subject to negative repercussions of the repeat player effect 
than the above cited studies outside FINRA.28 
Another study by Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas has 
found that mandatory arbitration shows up often even in employment 
agreements with CEOs (in over 41% of examined contracts).29 
Moreover, work by Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin provides a more 
general assessment of mandatory arbitration, finding high rates in both 
employment and consumer finance contexts.30  
Clearly, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in the 
labor and employment context have become commonplace and are on 
the rise.31 
B. Consumer Finance 
The consumer finance category offers the most recent and robust 
data and analysis, chiefly in the congressionally ordered Consumer 
Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) study.32 David Horton and Andrea 
Cann Chandrasekher’s detailed and critical work and work by 
 
was previously NASD. (The author has been a FINRA neutral since 2012 and, while 
informed by this experience, is not generally relying on it for purposes of this Article.). 
 26. See id. at 115–16. 
 27. See id. (stating that the employment dispute arbitration program governed 
by FINRA applies to those employees registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
 28. See id. at 120–25. 
 29. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of 
CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 231, 234 (2006). 
 30. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, 
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 880–86 
(2008). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at 882–83, 886. 
 32. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 2, at 6–25 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB STUDY]; see also 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–641 (2010) (containing law 
relevant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). 
1040 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
Demaine and Hensler also show high rates of mandatory arbitration 
provisions in consumer finance contracts.33 
The CFPB study, reported to Congress in 2015, provides the 
most comprehensive data on the proliferation of mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.34 CFPB data on student loans, bank 
accounts, payday loans, prepaid cards, and mobile wireless 
subscriptions showed very high rates (generally between 83% and 
92%) of mandatory arbitration.35 The CFPB’s still recent study on 
consumer finance arbitration, mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act in the 
wake of the 2008 financial tsunami, offers some useful data in 
understanding the reality of disputes in the field.36 Not least 
meaningful is the CFPB Report’s conclusion that upwards of 85% of 
consumers who entered into contracts with mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses during the period studied were unaware of having 
done so.37 
The same CFPB data shows a contrastingly lower rate (under 
16%) of mandatory arbitration in credit card agreements.38 This lower 
rate of mandatory arbitration in credit card agreements has been 
confirmed in studies by Drahazol and Rutledge.39 Yet, for our 
purposes, this data shows very high rates of mandatory arbitration 
provisions in the general consumer finance category.40 
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherman make the interesting 
observation that among corporations that include mandatory 
arbitration provisions in their consumer and employment contracts, 
few include arbitration clauses in their non-consumer corporate 
contracts such as supplier agreements and other material contracts 
disclosed in their SEC filings.41 Myriad interpretations of the 
 
 33. See Horton & Chandraskher, supra note 18, at 98–115; see also Linda J. 
Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 55, 58–64 (2004). 
 34. See CFPB STUDY, supra note 32, § 2, at 6–8. 
 35. See id. at 6–26. 
 36. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 
1028(a); see also CFPB STUDY, supra note 32, § 5, at 11–15, 35–38, 67. 
 37. See CFPB STUDY, supra note 32, § 1, at 11.  
 38. See id. § 2, at 8–10. 
 39. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in 
Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 557–
60 (2012); see also Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and 
Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2013). 
 40. See CFPB STUDY, supra note 32, § 2, at 8. 
 41. See Eisenberg, Miller & Sherman, supra note 30, at 886–87. 
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motivation for this can be proffered, and Eisenberg, Miller, and 
Sherman offer some.42  
Tangentially, Mark Budnitz and Christopher Drahazol have 
studied the costs of consumer finance arbitration, the study itself a 
testament to the high rates of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in 
consumer contracts.43 Thus, overall, in the relatively broad consumer 
finance category, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions have 
become ubiquitous. 
C. Broker-Dealer 
The vast majority of consumer and registered person employee 
disputes with brokers and broker-dealers are resolved by FINRA 
arbitration pursuant to FINRA Rule 12200.44 Importantly, though, 
FINRA rule 12204 provides that class action claims may not be 
 
 42. See id. at 887. 
 43. See Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer 
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 133, 135–43 (2004); Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 817–26 (2008). 
 44. See 12200. Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of 
FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/12200 
[https://perma.cc/HLN5-AP5V] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (“Parties must arbitrate a 
dispute under the Code if: Arbitration under the Code is either[] (1) Required by a 
written agreement, or (2) Requested by the customer; [t]he dispute is between a 
customer and a member or associated person of a member; and [t]he dispute arises in 
connection with the business activities of the member or the associated person, except 
disputes involving the insurance business activities of a member that is also an 
insurance company.”); FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION at 1 (2015); see also Barr, supra note 6, at 800 (referring to very 
high rates of mandatory arbitration provisions in broker dealer contracts but offering 
no actual data).  
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arbitrated.45 Rather, FINRA directs class action claims to court.46 This 
class claim exception exists as a way around the principal FINRA rule 
providing that a dispute must be resolved by arbitration if it is subject 
to a written agreement so requiring or if a brokerage customer requests 
arbitration.47 While arbitration of broker-dealer disputes can proceed 
under AAA, JAMS, or another arbitration forum, the vast majority 
proceed through FINRA, the self-regulatory body overseen by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).48  
Black and Gross have attributed the ubiquitous use of mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the securities industry to the 
Supreme Court’s McMahon decision.49 Related work by Gross and 
 
 45. See 12204. Class Action Claims, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/12204 [https://perma.cc/3XKZ-B82F] (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2019) (“(a) Class action claims may not be arbitrated under the Code. (b) 
Any claim that is based upon the same facts and law, and involves the same defendants 
as in a court-certified class action or a putative class action, or that is ordered by a 
court for class-wide arbitration at a forum not sponsored by a self-regulatory 
organization, shall not be arbitrated under the Code, unless the party bringing the 
claim files with FINRA one of the following: (1) a copy of a notice filed with the court 
in which the class action is pending that the party will not participate in the class action 
or in any recovery that may result from the class action, or has withdrawn from the 
class according to any conditions set by the court; or (2) a notice that the party will 
not participate in the class action or in any recovery that may result from the class 
action. (c) The Director will refer to a panel any dispute as to whether a claim is part 
of a class action, unless a party asks the court hearing the class action to resolve the 
dispute within 10 days of receiving notice that the Director has decided to refer the 
dispute to a panel. (d) A member or associated person may not enforce any arbitration 
agreement against a member of a certified or putative class action with respect to any 
claim that is the subject of the certified or putative class action until: the class 
certification is denied; the class is decertified; the member of the certified or putative 
class is excluded from the class by the court; or the member of the certified or putative 
class elects not to participate in the class or withdraws from the class according to 
conditions set by the court, if any. This paragraph does not otherwise affect the 
enforceability of any rights under this Code or any other agreement.”).  
 46. See id. (establishing an important distinction between FINRA arbitration 
and any other variety of arbitration discussed herein and offering a good example of 
a way that at least some of the unsuccessful recent challenges to class waivers in 
arbitration clauses might be avoided or redressed). 
 47. See id. (stating how FINRA Rule 12204, which does not allow for class 
action arbitration, is an exception to the FINRA Rule 12200, which enforces all 
written arbitration agreements). 
 48. See Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s Nonwaivable Right to Choose 
Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383, 385–
86, 395–401 (2016). 
 49. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The 
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 992–95 (2002) 
(attributing the proliferation of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in the 
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Black surveying 25,000 investors demonstrates that investors perceive 
unfairness in mandatory broker-dealer arbitration but speaks further 
simply as testament to the uniform use of written agreements requiring 
arbitration in the investment field.50 
For purposes of this Article, the primary take away from these 
studies, in aggregate, is that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
have become the norm in each of the employment, consumer finance, 
and investment arenas.51 Certainly, these studies do not arrive at a 
consensus as to the superiority of either arbitration or litigation. One 
should note, though, that the clear majority of the studies cited above 
are critical of mandatory arbitration.52 Of course, the very existence of 
a large body of Supreme Court cases on the topic is further evidence 
that many contracts include mandatory arbitration provisions and that 
they have been repeatedly challenged.53 
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S EPIC SYSTEMS DECISION AND ITS 
PRECURSORS 
With the proliferation of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions in mind, the enforceability of such provisions takes on 
heightened import. The springboard for considering the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of such provisions is the recent Epic Systems 
decision.54  
 
securities industry to Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), 
and noting a 2000 GAO study and personal knowledge of commonplace use of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in the securities industry). 
 50. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, When Perception Changes Reality: An 
Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. 
DISP. RES. 349, 357–61 (2008). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 350–51 (describing the commonality of arbitration clauses 
in the financial securities market and consumers’ general waryness of such clauses). 
 52. See id. at 400–01 (recognizing that critics have raised certain problems 
with arbitration, suggesting the need for change). 
 53. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 222; Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 429–30 (1953). 
 54. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623–24 (2018) 
(describing the Court’s treatment toward conflicting acts which precribe how to treat 
pre-dispute arbitration provisions). Between draft and print of this Article, the Court 
handed down yet another decision on arbitration in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. 
Ct. 1407 (2019). The author does not believe this more recent decision requires 
alteration of the present work. 
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A. The Long Lead-Up to Epic Systems 
If the FAA was a watershed shifting federal legislative and court 
policy from general disfavor of arbitration to express endorsement of 
or even promotion of arbitration, subsequent Supreme Court 
interpretation of the FAA has been still more altering.55 Both the 
jurisprudence enforcing, and the scholarly commentary opposing, 
Supreme Court enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions has 
been consistent (post Wilko) across each of the employment, consumer 
finance, and investment categories. 
The Court’s earliest interpretation of the FAA was in the 
securities field and in retrospect would belie the future of the Court’s 
approach. Broadly, in Wilko v. Swan,56 the Court refused to enforce a 
pre-dispute arbitration clause in a margin agreement between a 
brokerage firm and its customer, finding that Section 14 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (‘33 Act) effectively blocked a waiver of the 
right to bring a court action for a Section 12(2) fraud claim under the 
‘33 Act and trumped the FAA directive toward enforcement of 
arbitration agreements like all other contracts.57 
In Wilko, then, the Court found congressional intent in a federal 
law (the ‘33 Act) that made the right to select a judicial forum to 
adjudicate disputes relating to a contract unwaivable to be superior to 
another earlier federal law, the FAA (1925).58 At the time of Wilko 
(1953), the FAA Section 2 requirement to treat agreements about 
arbitration as enforceable like any other contract, subject to defenses 
to enforceability as with any other contract, was still, more than 
twenty-five years after its passing, seen by the Court as a redress 
countering the prior federal disfavor of arbitration.59 It was, as yet, in 
no way a mandate to aggressively preference the FAA and arbitration 
agreement enforcement over other federal law or state law, whether 
substantive or procedural.60 Note that the ‘33 Act came eight years 
 
 55. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the 
Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255, 265–82 (1998); Diffusing Disputes, supra 
note 6, at 2862–74. 
 56. 346 U.S. 427.  
 57. See id. at 435–36; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2018) (“Any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules, and regulations of 
the Commission shall be void.”). 
 58. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434–45. 
 59. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (describing its position 
on 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 60. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
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after the FAA and that the 1953 Wilko decision expressly considered 
distinctions between arbitral and judicial decision making.61 
Thirteen years after Wilko, in 1967, the Court jibed in Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing. Co., creating the 
“separability doctrine,” holding that the FAA controlled and required 
enforcement of an arbitration clause in a consulting agreement relating 
to the purchase and sale of a paint business.62 One party sought to rely 
on a consulting agreement arbitration clause to resolve a dispute 
alleging fraud in the inducement to the consulting agreement.63 The 
Court held that pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA, while arbitrators 
should not decide a fraud in the inducement claim relating specifically 
to an arbitration clause in itself, arbitrators should decide a fraud in 
the inducement claim as to the whole contract containing the clause.64 
In Prima Paint, the Court flipped to express no concern with 
arbitrators deciding “legal” issues and emphasized the freedom of 
contract to justify enforcement of whatever dispute resolution terms 
parties agreed to in a contract.65 
From Prima Paint to the present Epic Systems decision, the 
Court has consistently held its course counter to Wilko, tacking 
through repeated challenges to arbitration in each of the employment, 
consumer finance, and securities contexts. 
The Court looked at another securities related case in 1974, 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,66 where it heard a claim in part reliant 
upon Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act).67 
Alberto Culver argued that the ‘34 Act precluded its dispute from 
arbitration pursuant to Section 29 of the ‘34 Act, analogous to Section 
14 of the ‘33 Act at the heart of Wilko.68 The Scherk case involved an 
international business transaction including a stock purchase governed 
 
 61. See id. at 435–37. 
 62. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–
04 (1967). 
 63. See id. at 397–98. 
 64. See id. at 404–07. 
 65. Id. at 406. 
 66. See generally Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (noting 
the action is brought under the Securities Exchange Act). 
 67. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); SEC 
Commission Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).  
 68. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78cc (a) (“Any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision 
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-
regulatory organization, shall be void.”); Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513–19. 
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in part by an agreement to arbitrate related disputes in France.69 In 
finding that Section 29 did not prohibit a litigation waiver, the Scherk 
Court relied primarily on the international nature of the transaction at 
issue in the case and held that the agreement to arbitrate was in effect 
a kind of forum selection clause that must be upheld to avoid 
interfering with and unsettling international commerce.70 Thus, Scherk 
expanded the more pronounced pro-arbitration precedent of Prima 
Paint which had flipped Wilko.71 The Scherk Court, essentially 
opposite the Wilko Court, found the FAA directive supporting 
arbitration to be stronger than the policy behind the litigation waiver 
prohibition of Section 29 of the ‘34 Act.72 Scherk emphasized the 
established norm and import of arbitration for dispute resolution in 
international business and broadened the enforcement of mandatory 
arbitration in the securities or investment field. 
In 1983 with Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp. and in 1984 with Southland Corp. v. Keating, the 
Court respectively entertained challenges first to contractual 
arbitration between a hospital and a construction company and then to 
contractual arbitration between franchisees and a franchisor.73 In these 
decisions, the Court firmly established that the FAA and its decisions 
under the FAA constitute a body of federal substantive law on 
arbitration enforcement that preempts state law, full stop.74 Moses 
Cone held that federal appellate court jurisdiction was proper to 
review a state district court action staying a federal district court action 
to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA and proceeded to 
find arbitrable a contract dispute between the hospital and its 
contractor.75 The Southland decision emphatically promoted 
arbitration and grounded this promotion in the legislative history of 
the FAA, casting aside the view that the character of the law 
concerning arbitration was procedural.76 The Southland Court held 
 
 69. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508. 
 70. See id. at 515–19. 
 71. See id. at 513–15 (noting the Court’s discussion of Wilko and the effect 
of Prima Paint). 
 72. See id. at 515–17. 
 73. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 5 (1983). 
 74. See, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 12–13; Margaret M. Harding, The Clash 
Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration 
as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 468–77 (1998) (discussing the 
central issue in Southland). 
 75. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 28–29. 
 76. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 13–14. 
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that under the Supremacy clause, Section 2 of the FAA controlled the 
question of arbitrability of a dispute between a franchisor and several 
franchisees, not the state law of California.77 Notably, Southland 
expressly left open the question of whether the FAA barred class 
arbitration—a question, of course, that was later to arise again.78 
In 1985, the Court addressed a challenge to mandatory 
arbitration for the third year in a row with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.79 In Mitsubishi, the Court found 
arbitrable a claim brought by a Swiss-Japanese joint venture 
automobile supplier against a Puerto Rican car dealership with whom 
it had a sales agreement.80 In finding arbitrable the claim which arose 
in part under the Sherman Antitrust Act,81 the Court looked to its 
precedent in Scherk, again noting the pro-arbitration context of 
international commerce.82 Thus, with Mitsubishi, the purview of 
enforceable arbitration grew to explicitly incorporate arbitral 
decisions over federal statutory claims, contrary to Wilko.83 
In 1987, the Court returned to another securities industry 
arbitration challenge in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. 
McMahon.84 Unlike the securities claims made in Scherk, the 
securities claims in McMahon involved a wholly domestic contract-
based dispute between a brokerage customer and brokerage.85 In 
McMahon, the Court more comprehensively addressed the issue of 
whether Section 29(a) of the ‘34 Act indicated congressional intent 
regarding the waiver of litigation rights in the ‘34 Act that would 
trump the FAA—an argument again grounded in the then-flipped 
Wilko reasoning regarding Section 14 of the ‘33 Act.86 Distinguishing 
Section 14 of the ‘33 Act and Section 29 of the ‘34 Act based upon 
interpretation of legislative intent, the McMahon Court proceeded to 
enforce the mandatory arbitration provision in the consumer 
 
 77. See id.  
 78. See id. at 16. 
 79. See generally 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (addressing the arbitrability of RICO 
claims). 
 80. See id. at 616–20. 
 81. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018). 
 82. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628–32. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See generally Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 
(1987) (addressing arbitration in private securities fraud claims arising under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 85. See id. at 222–23. 
 86. See id. at 228–31. 
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investment contract at issue.87 Looking back to statements of policy 
embodied in the FAA and amplified in Prima Paint, Scherk, Moses 
Cone, Southland, and Mitsubishi, the Court seemed to catalogue its 
precedent, solidifying whole-hearted enforcement of mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration provisions.88 Pointedly, in McMahon, one can note 
the major shift in the character of challenges to arbitration from the 
earlier, mostly business-to-business challenges (stemming from the 
origins of arbitration as a primarily business-to-business, sophisticated 
commercial practice) to consumer-versus-business challenges.89 
In 1989, just two years after McMahon, the Court explicitly 
overturned Wilko in the ‘33 Act context in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., now stating that Section 14 of the 
‘33 Act did not preclude waivers of litigation rights to Section 12(2) 
fraud claims.90 The Rodriguez de Quijas Court relied again on the 
Court’s own expanding pro-arbitration precedent since Wilko, giving 
particular weight to McMahon.91 Like McMahon, Rodrigues de Quijas 
was again a consumer-versus-brokerage battle over an investment 
contract.92 The Court once again noted “the old judicial hostility to 
arbitration,” harkening back to the policy justifications for the FAA’s 
passage back in 1925, and assessed the effect of its own precedent as 
constituting the erosion of that anti-arbitration view.93  
In the 1991 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. decision, 
the Court enforced mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of an Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) claim pursuant 
to an agreement between a securities representative and a brokerage 
(which agreement was not characterized as an employment 
agreement), subject to New York Stock Exchange rules (prior to the 
establishment of FINRA).94 Thus, the Court continued to strengthen 
the enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration even regarding 
a broadening array of statutory-based claims.95 Moreover, the Court 
robustly cast aside the unconscionability argument that the individual 
plaintiff in Gilmer stood no chance of equal bargaining power against 
 
 87. See id.  
 88. See id. 
 89. See id.  
 90. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S 477, 
483–85 (1989). 
 91. See id. at 480–85. 
 92. See id. at 478. 
 93. Id. at 480–81 (quoting Kulkundis Shipping Co. v. Armtorg Trading 
Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
 94. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
 95. See id. at 27–33. 
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the big corporation brokerage, in this instance the employee against 
the large employer.96 Gilmer, then, straddles the categories of 
investment and employment and continues the Court’s strong 
enforcement of arbitration in both of these categories of concern.97 
The attention of the Court turned to the class action component 
of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in 2010 with Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.98 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court 
interpreted the FAA and its precedent to find that an arbitration clause 
that does not explicitly provide for class arbitration does not permit 
class arbitration.99 The Stolt-Nielson decision looked repeatedly to the 
Court’s decade earlier decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,100 reiterating 
that arbitration agreements should be read and enforced strictly 
according to their terms.101 The Volt Court’s reasoning appeared 
consistent with earlier freedom-of-contract-based arguments, 
emphasizing that parties to a contract may consent to whatever terms 
they choose and those terms should be enforced.102 
In 2011, class arbitration moved further to the forefront of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence just a year after Stolt-Nielson in the 
quintessential consumer finance context of AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion.103 In Concepcion, consumers who had entered into cell 
phone contracts with AT&T sought to bring a class arbitration against 
AT&T.104 However, the arbitration clause at issue specifically required 
individual arbitration.105 The same clause entitled AT&T to make 
unilateral amendments to the controlling agreement.106 The Supreme 
Court reversed lower courts which had found the contract between 
AT&T and the Concepcions unconscionable.107 The lower courts, 
looking to California’s Discover Bank rule, had found the terms of the 
AT&T agreement not offering class arbitration to be an 
 
 96. See id. at 32–33. 
 97. See id. at 35 (continuing the enforcement of arbitration). 
 98. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 99. See id. at 687. 
 100. See id. at 681–82 (discussing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)). 
 101. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 468–69. 
 102. See id. at 478. 
 103. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 104. See id. at 337. 
 105. See id. at 336. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 338, 352. 
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unconscionable denial of consumer rights.108 In reversing, the Court 
again grounded its decision in a freedom of contract analysis, looking 
back to the policies buttressing the FAA and referencing its now 
increasingly voluminous Supreme Court precedent enforcing, if not 
promoting, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.109 While referring to 
Section 2 of the FAA, stating that the FAA required the Court to put 
agreements about arbitration on the same footing as other contracts, 
the Court wrestled with the FAA’s Section 2 savings clause.110 The 
Section 2 savings clause further provides that general defenses to 
contract must also be recognized and applied to agreements including 
arbitration clauses, but such defenses do not include defenses unique 
to arbitration provisions alone.111 Ultimately, the Concepcion decision 
stands more as a testament to federal preemption of state law, even as 
it built the Court’s enforcement of arbitration clauses crafted to 
preclude class arbitration and further undermined any real 
consideration by the Court of general unconscionability defenses 
based upon the unequal bargaining power between consumers like the 
Concepcions and large corporations like AT&T. 
In 2012, the Court considered the issue of whether the FAA 
excluded employment agreements from its purview of enforcing 
arbitration clauses in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair Adams.112 
The Court determined that the language at issue in Section 1 of the 
FAA indicated the exclusion of employment agreements only 
concerned workers in the transportation field and not generally.113 In 
so doing, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s more encompassing 
interpretation of the FAA’s Section 1 was both incorrect and 
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court precedent.114 
The plight of consumers who entered into mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements again reached the Supreme Court just a year 
after Concepcion in the 2012 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood 
decision.115 In CompuCredit, the Court considered whether a non-
waiver of litigation provision in the Credit Repair Organizations Act 
 
 108. See id. at 338. 
 109. See id. at 344–48. 
 110. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336. 
 111. See § 2. 
 112. 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
 113. See § 1 (“[B]ut nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.”); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113–21. 
 114. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113–21. 
 115. 565 U.S. 95 (2012). 
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(CROA), which created a private right of action to pursue remedies 
via class action, constituted a contrary congressional command to the 
FAA.116 The CompuCredit Court held that the CROA provision did 
not constitute a contrary congressional command that would favor the 
CROA over the FAA directive of enforcing agreements to arbitrate.117 
The Court emphasized that the CROA did not mention arbitration and 
so proceeded to enforce the consumer credit card agreement that 
mandated arbitration.118 
Another important case arising in the securities industry in 2012 
and regarding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration that did not reach the 
U.S. Supreme Court is Department of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab 
& Co., Inc.119 Schwab concerned an investment contract between the 
brokerage and its customers requiring them to waive their rights to 
class arbitration and class civil litigation.120 In Schwab, the FINRA 
Board of Governors avoided the contrary congressional command 
precedent from the Supreme Court, which had consistently held that 
the FAA trumped other legislation.121 The Board of Governors found 
FINRA Rule 12204 (prohibiting class arbitration and permitting class 
civil litigation) enforceable notwithstanding the FAA and its Supreme 
Court interpretation.122 The decision emphasized the policy behind the 
FINRA rule permitting or requiring class action only through the civil 
courts and noted that the very reason for the rule was to provide access 
to the courts that have “developed procedures and the expertise to 
manage class actions.”123 While the Board of Governors found that the 
FAA certainly applied to the FINRA Rule and the Schwab arbitration 
policy, unlike the Supreme Court, the Board of Governors also found 
that Section 15 of the ‘34 Act empowered FINRA to regulate 
 
 116. See id. at 96. 
 117. See id. at 102–03 (“It takes a considerable stretch to regard the nonwaiver 
provision as a ‘congressional command’ that the FAA shall not apply.”). 
 118. See id. at 104 (“Because the CROA is silent on whether claims under the 
Act can proceed in an arbitral forum, the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to 
be enforced according to its terms.”). 
 119. See Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Complaint No. 
2011029760201 1, 2 (FINRA April 24, 2014). 
 120. See id. at 1–2. 
 121. See id. at 23–25. 
 122. See FINRA, supra note 45; see also Schwab, Complaint No. 
2011029760201 at 7 (“We affirm the Hearing Panel’s findings that Schwab’s Waiver 
violated NASD and FINRA rules, but reverse the finding that the FAA precludes 
FINRA from enforcing the rule violations in causes one and two.”). 
 123. Schwab, Complaint No. 2011029760201 at 14. 
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arbitration in FINRA’s forum.124 Then, in overturning a prior Hearing 
Panel decision on the case, the Board of Governors drew an analogy 
of FINRA with the CFPB finding that FINRA regulations have the 
force of law and that the SEC, and through it, FINRA, has 
congressional command via the ‘34 Act to make and enforce the rule 
permitting class civil litigation notwithstanding the Supreme Court 
interpretation of the FAA enforcing class waivers.125 
Class arbitration came before the Court again in 2013 with 
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant.126 In Italian Colors, 
small business merchants accepting American Express cards for 
payment attempted to seek redress as a class.127 The mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clause the claimants had entered into with 
American Express contained an explicit prohibition of class 
arbitration.128 The Court again found no contrary congressional 
command in other federal law (this time asserted to lie in antitrust 
laws) that would trump the FAA.129 The Court eschewed concern for 
the illogic of small claimants bearing the burden of sole arbitration, 
holding that the cost of individual arbitration was no bar to enforcing 
contracts in which the parties agreed to it, even where the remedy 
sought was of less value than the cost to the sole claimant to 
arbitrate.130 Thus, the Court refused to recognize the asserted 
“‘effective vindication’ doctrine.”131 Yet again, in 2015, the Court 
propounded its enforcement of class arbitration waivers against 
 
 124. See id. at 18 (“Exchange Act § 15A empowers FINRA to regulate broker-
dealers including how they resolve disputes with their customers, subject to SEC 
oversight.”). 
 125. See id. at 21 (“The Exchange Act’s broad authorization encompassing 
FINRA arbitration rules that are approved by the SEC constitutes the Supreme Court’s 
required congressional command to overcome the general mandate of the FAA to 
enforce arbitration agreements.”); see also Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor 
Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 44–48 
(2012) (detailing the authority FINRA and the SEC have regarding arbitration). 
 126. Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013) (“We 
consider whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the 
Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal 
statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 236–39.  
 129. See id. at 228. 
 130. See id. at 235–36. 
 131. Id.; see also Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme 
Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. 
REV. 111, 131 (2015) (discussing how the majority rejected the doctrine, while Justice 
Scalia defended it in his dissent). 
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consumers in DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.132 In DirecTV, the Court 
again drove home federal preemption of the FAA over state law even 
where a contract expressly deferred legality of a class waiver to the 
law of the contracting consumer’s state.133 Had the Court found that 
the state law reference controlled, under the California Discover Bank 
rule, the DirecTV class waiver would have been found 
unconscionable.134 However, once again the still-expanding Supreme 
Court precedent on mandatory arbitration continued to strongly 
disfavor consumer challenges.135 
B. Epic Systems 
Coming full circle, in June of 2018 the Court handed down its 
decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.136 While the Court considered 
arguments more focused on the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), it again did not find in the NLRA a contrary congressional 
command superior to the FAA.137 The Court held that Section 7 of the 
NLRA, protecting the right of employees “to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection” did not include in its protection class 
arbitration by employees who believed their employers were violating 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.138 Moreover, the Court reiterated its now 
well-established position that the FAA requires enforcement of 
whatever arbitration provisions parties agree to in a contract.139 The 
Court held that the FAA savings clause defenses to contract generally, 
including illegality based upon the alleged blocking of concerted 
action protected by the NLRA, did not apply.140 
 
 132. See generally DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) 
(addressing enforceability of a DirecTV’s class arbitration waivers and whether state 
or federal law controlled). 
 133. See id. at 465–68 (noting the state court’s opinion that if state law’s 
prohibition of the class waiver applied, it would contractually invalidate the entire 
arbitration clause).  
 134. See id. at 466. 
 135. See id. at 471. 
 136. See generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 137. See id. at 1624; O’Brien, supra note 9, at 540–45 (setting up the NLRA 
arguments heard by the Court in the cases consolidated in the Epic Systems decision); 
see also Greene & O’Brien, supra note 9, at 96–98 (furthering the § 7 NLRA claims). 
 138. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 216(b) (2018). 
 139. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623–24. 
 140. See id. at 1622–25. 
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Writing for the majority in Epic Systems, Justice Gorsuch 
commented,  
You might wonder if the balance Congress struck in 1925 between 
arbitration and litigation should be revisited in light of more contemporary 
developments. You might even ask if the [FAA] was good policy when 
enacted. But all the same you might find it difficult to see how to avoid the 
statute’s application.141  
Once again, the Court looked backward to its own repeated recasting 
of the 1925 passage of the FAA only to justify the apparent 
implausibility of defenses to contract that might apply to arbitration 
provisions yet not be characterized as particular to defending 
arbitration provisions.142 Indeed, Gorsuch found the fatal flaw in the 
Epic Systems plaintiff’s defense to contract argument under the FAA 
savings clause to lie in the failure to convince the majority that the 
defense applied to “any” contract, not specifically to the arbitration 
contract provision.143 
Thus, for over fifty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
constructed a solid and expansive jurisprudence strengthening the 
enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in each 
of the areas of employment, consumer finance, and investment 
contracts.144 As the Court has built the enforcement precedent, 
defenses to contract in each of these areas have further eroded; 
justified by the original policies given by Congress when passing the 
FAA back in 1925, freedom of contract and the proclaimed superiority 
of the FAA over other federal (and state) legislation alleged to embody 
contrary congressional commands.145 In the twenty-first century, the 
Court has included in this project the enforcement of class action 
waivers and class arbitration prohibitions, most recently in the 
employment context with the Epic Systems Court’s refusal to find 
concerted action protected under the NLRA.146 
 
 141. Id. at 1621–22. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 1622–23 (emphasis added). 
 144. See, e.g., Greene & O’Brien, supra note 9, at 82–88 (discussing earlier 
arbitration precedent closely related to the Supreme Court’s Epic Systems decision). 
 145. See, e.g., Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1621–23. 
 146. See, e.g., id. at 1624–27. 
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C. Criticism of Supreme Court Arbitration Jurisprudence (and 
Arbitration Generally) 
Epic Systems would appear to leave the law on enforcing 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration well-settled while leaving unheeded 
the scholarly criticism of both the Court’s enforcement of arbitration 
contracts and its rejection of the many arguments for a parallel 
recognition of contract defenses under the FAA savings clause.147 That 
scholarly criticism includes claims that the Court has falsely inflated 
the now well-aged FAA policy directive (literally to put arbitration 
contracts on equal footing with other contracts) and flouted any 
concern for resulting social injustice disempowering consumers and 
small businesses.148 Related to concerns of social injustice, the 
diminution of constitutional rights, and excessive delegation, many 
have cried out that the entire civil litigation system is rapidly being 
replaced with a private, unreviewable dispute resolution system.149 
Notwithstanding the spirited criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
pro-arbitration jurisprudence, there now would seem to be little chance 
of the Court reversing itself on its quite substantial body of precedent 
enforcing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.150 This reality leaves us 
with the central motivation for this Article—contemplating a solution 
to the discord between the Court’s jurisprudence on arbitration and the 
weighty, yet unembraced, scholarly criticism of it.  
This Article suggests that we consider volitional contractual 
mediation as an alternative. This proposal is, in a sense, a response to 
Justice Gorsuch’s pondering in Epic Systems; indeed, we might 
wonder if that purported 1925 balance “should be revisited in light of 
more contemporary developments.”151 
 
 147. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist 
Proposals for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 738–40 (2016) (proposing 
alternative positions on enforcement and defense such as unconscionability).  
 148. See Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2894–98 (pointing out all that is 
given up in procedure, public reviewability, and appeal rights when civil litigation is 
replaced with arbitration); Fairness in Numbers, supra note 6, at 154–68 
(emphasizing due process and fairness concerns with class action waivers).  
 149. See Fairness in Numbers, supra note 6, at 160–68; Ware, supra note 147, 
at 739–40 (discussing five approaches to enforcing arbitration, arguing for a “centrist” 
position and giving particular attention to the political alignment of justices on the 
Supreme Court as treatment of arbitration enforcement changed, particularly in the 
2000s). 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1622. 
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Parts I and II of this paper should make clear that much is wrong 
with arbitration.152 If intended to be a less costly, less time-consuming, 
less complex, just alternative to civil litigation, present day arbitration 
in the big versus small contexts of employment, consumer finance, 
and investment contracts is largely a failure.153 It has become ever 
more expensive, more time-consuming, and more like the civil 
litigation it was intended to avoid.154 It has shifted from business-to-
business to business-to-consumer, and unlike civil litigation, it offers 
little or no chance of appeal, public reviewability, or accountability, 
and it relies on often only summarily trained neutrals to make life-
altering decisions.155 Hence, some have proposed modifications to 
arbitration practice.156 Perhaps motivated chiefly by the extremely 
narrow grounds for review of arbitration, legislators have attempted to 
work around the FAA and the Court’s interpretation of it.157 Indeed, a 
number of legislative attempts have been made to counter the Court in 
our system of federal government where the three branches are always 
at play counterbalancing one another.158  
 
 152. See supra Parts I, II. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2848–49. 
 155. See id. at 2847–60; Fairness in Numbers, supra note 6, at 154–61. 
 156. See Glover, supra note 6, at 3055 (discussing the private contract 
character of arbitration); see also Charles W. Tyler, Lawmaking in the Shadow of the 
Bargain: Contract Procedure as a Second-Best Alternative to Mandatory Arbitration, 
122 YALE L.J. 1560, 1582–91 (2013) (proposing contractual “procedural optionality” 
in litigation as an alternative to arbitration). See generally Richard C. Reuben, 
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000) (proposing that state action is 
present in private civil arbitration and extrapolating the ramifications of applying 
constitutional norms to arbitration and dispute resolution generally).  
 157. See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest 
Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 183–86 (2011) (calling on the 
courts to enforce the manifest disregard of the law standard of review of arbitration 
decisions). 
 158. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 
931, 111th Cong. (2009). Most recently, this has been introduced in the House by 
Rep. David Cicilline and in the Senate by Sen. Leahy in March of 2017. See Restoring 
Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, H.R. 1396, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, S. 550, 
115th Cong. (2017). First, this legislation would exempt from the FAA claims brought 
by individuals or small businesses arising from violations of federal or state law, the 
U.S. Constitution or a state constitution and, accordingly, would permit these claims 
to proceed in a court of law. See Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States 
Act of 2017, H.R. 1396 § 3(b) (discussing how arbitration is still an option if the 
parties voluntarily choose to arbitrate a dispute after it arises). Second, the bill would 
allow federal and state courts to apply their respective jurisdictional laws concerning 
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Critics have characterized the very nature of arbitration as 
undemocratic, pointing particularly to its questionable upholding of 
the legal values of equal protection and due process yet holding out 
potential benefits of arbitration as part of a larger judicial system.159 In 
looking at the increased prominence of arbitration in place of litigation 
and at arbitration’s flaws, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley has recognized part 
of the critical problem concerning this work—the scholarly criticism 
of the Court’s “favorable attitudes” toward arbitration in the consumer 
and employment settings.160 “The Court has thrown the U.S. out of 
step with other advanced countries and made arbitration agreements a 
focus of criticism.”161 It would seem that the Court has spurred the 
growth of a form of dispute resolution that is on many accounts 
exacerbating conflict.162 Of course, civil litigation, though a 
constitutional guarantee and though indisputably governed by 
doctrines of equal protection and due process, is hardly an ideal 
alternative. It is perhaps also ironic that the very concerns that drove 
the flight from court to arbitration have not been sufficiently 
diminished.163 Cost, time, complexity, and lawyerly gamesmanship 
have come to plague arbitration itself.164 
Moreover, the contract-defense-based arguments countering the 
Court’s propensity to enforce mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions have left unequal bargaining power and the doctrine of 
unconscionability virtually meaningless in the arbitration context.165 
 
contract interpretation to find arbitration provisions unconscionable or unenforceable 
notwithstanding the FAA. See id. § 3(c). Third, the bill would give to the courts, not 
arbitrators, the essential task of determining whether an arbitration agreement is 
enforceable in the first place. See id. § 3(d). 
 159. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The 
Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 290–308 (2004). See 
generally David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2011) 
(making the point that the Court’s enforcement of mandatory arbitration effectively 
violated the non-delegation doctrine by delegating lawmaking to private organizations 
and people). 
 160. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration”, 17 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2012). 
 161. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the Dream of ADR: Reflections on Four 
Decades of the Quiet Revolution in Dispute Resolution, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 513, 536 (2017). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 513–14. 
 164. See id. at 536–37. 
 165. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 55, at 278–98; William Alan Nelson II, Take 
It or Leave It: Unconscionability of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements 
in the Securities Industry, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 609–11 (2015); Sternlight & 
Jensen, supra note 6, at 77–90.  
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The extreme inequality of bargaining power evident in each of the 
contexts of employment, consumer finance, and securities industry 
related agreements has failed to move the Court in the many cases 
constituting the now-solidified jurisprudence the Court has built to 
sustain and enhance mandatory arbitration.166 
We are at an impasse in scholarly assessment of the Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence.167 We are at an impasse culturally, where 
unknowing, relatively powerless citizens enter into mandatory 
arbitration provisions routinely in order to conduct commonplace 
transactions in our consumer society.168 The only redress of the 
relatively powerless is often an economically irrational option to 
proceed with sole arbitration for de minimis individual wrongs that, in 
the aggregate, may yield tens or hundreds of millions of dollars for the 
wrongdoer.169 Yet, routine waivers of class actions and class 
arbitration claims are now enforced.170 So the aggregate check on large 
scale wrongdoing affecting individuals in minimal ways, yet reaping 
quite sizeable unjust rewards, is dead.171 We need an alternative to the 
unacceptable stalemate that is our current milieu. 
III. THE MEDIATION ALTERNATIVE TO ARBITRATION 
We should consider promoting contractual mediation as an 
alternative to the mandatory arbitration gridlock.172 Of course, the 
distinctions between arbitration and mediation are great.173 As critics 
have pointed out, arbitration entails the practically unreviewable final 
 
 166. See Barr, supra note 6, at 806 (noting that consumers generally do not 
give opportunity for meaningful consent due to inequality of bargaining power). 
 167. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 160, at 66 (“Arbitration is, in many 
respects, in crisis mode.”). 
 168. See Barr, supra note 6, at 806 (noting that “consumers pay little or no 
attention to arbitration clauses at the time of contracting”). 
 169. See Fairness in Numbers, supra note 6, at 122 (arguing that “enforcing 
boilerplate class waivers raises problems of equipage, equality, and fairness”). 
 170. See id. at 124–26 (noting two cases in which the Supreme Court has 
enforced contract waivers of class arbitration). 
 171. See id. at 127 (explaining that part of the reason courts have enforced 
contract waivers of class arbitration is that courts fear putting too much power in the 
hands of class arbitration plaintiffs). 
 172. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 160, at 63, 66 (arguing that mediation is the 
natural replacement for arbitration, which has become the new litigation). 
 173. See id. at 69 (describing the main difference between mediation and 
arbitration as mediation’s voluntariness). 
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decision by a neutral third party or panel.174 The arbitration process in 
many instances is very akin to litigation and involves an increasing 
amount of lawyering.175 Discovery may include multiple subpoenas 
for people or documents.176 Document production may include troves 
of bates numbered pages of e-correspondence and material 
agreements.177 Witness lists may be akin to parades.178 In short, the 
brevity and simplicity of arbitration has yielded to lawyered 
formalities recreating civil litigation in a private, unreviewed world.179 
Mediation is not a process of adjudication.180 Parties to mediation 
only resolve their disputes volitionally, by coming to an agreement in 
some way aided by a neutral third party.181 The approach is one of self-
determination, in great contrast to determination by a judge-like third 
party in arbitration.182 Variations of mediation may require court 
approval of agreements reached by the parties, varying levels of 
involvement by the mediator, emphasis on joint sessions or party 
separating caucuses and more.183 In its ideal form, the mediation 
process broadens the possibility of agreement addressing underlying 
issues in a dispute rather than focusing on narrow, legal conflicts 
 
 174. See Nelson, supra note 165, at 600 (explaining that courts have a very 
narrow and limited ability to review arbitration decisions). 
 175. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 160, at 66–67 (describing the tend in 
arbitration toward more litigation practices). 
 176. See Stipanowich, supra note 161, at 536–37 (noting that pretrial 
discovery and document discovery is permitted in arbitration proceedings). 
 177. See id. (listing the various forms of discovery allowed in arbitration 
proceedings). 
 178. See id. (explaining generally that arbitration proceedings have become 
more like litigation over time). 
 179. See id. (criticizing arbitration by stating that “the pendulum has swung 
too far in the direction of court-like procedure and away from expedition and cost-
effectiveness”). 
 180. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 160, at 68 (emphasizing the self-
determination and voluntary aspects of mediation). 
 181. See id. (stating that most mediation is defined by its voluntariness). 
 182. See id. at 68–69 (explaining that the major difference between mediation 
and arbitration is that mediation is self-determined). 
 183. See Leonard L. Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old 
Grid and the New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 29 (2003) [hereinafter The 
New Old Grid and the New Grid System] (describing the variety in mediation 
experiences based on the differences among mediators). 
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determined by a judge-like arbitrator.184 Its hallmarks are self-
determination and fairness.185 
Yet, any proposal to precede or replace arbitration with some 
version of mediation must recognize and address shortcomings of 
mediation that show up in differing versions of mediation.186  
A. Versions of Mediation 
1. Approaches 
Approaches neutral third parties employ in mediation and the 
contexts of mediation can vary quite substantially.187 Leonard Riskin’s 
basic rubric for categorizing approaches to mediation is well-settled in 
the field of alternative dispute resolution, though he has modified the 
rubric over time and cautions against overemphasizing it in any 
form.188 A commonly accepted modification of Riskin’s original 
“grid” includes the fundamental distinction of the evaluative, 
facilitative, and also the transformative approach to mediation.189 
“Evaluative” references an approach where a neutral third party 
mediator offers an informed assessment and prediction regarding each 
party’s position in the mediation.190 “Facilitative” refers to an approach 
where the third party neutral mediator does not evaluate but assists the 
 
 184. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 160, at 69 (describing individual remedies 
that may be had in mediation but are not available in litigation or arbitration). 
 185. See id. at 68–69 (praising mediation based upon its characteristics of self-
determination and “individualized justice”).  
 186. See id. at 74 (describing mediation’s slide toward litigation- and 
arbitration-type practices and the problems associated with that shift).  
 187. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, 
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 8 
(1996) (recognizing the variety of approaches to mediation). 
 188. See id. at 44–46 (describing Riskin’s original formulation of the grid 
rubric for mediation approaches); Leonard L. Riskin, Replacing the Mediator 
Orientation Grids, Again: The New Grid System, 23 ALTERNATIVES 127, 127, 129–31 
(2005) (explaining Riskin’s changes to the grid system as he would make them in 
2005); The New Old Grid and the New Grid System, supra note 183, at 5–13 
(explaining Riskin’s changes to the grid system in 2003); Robert Rubinson, Of Grids 
and Gatekeepers: The Socioeconomics of Mediation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 873, 878–82 (2016) (analyzing the evaluative and facilitative approaches from 
Riskin’s original grids); see also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE 
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 44 (2005) 
(citing Riskin to describe the development of a diversity of views regarding what 
mediation can and should be). 
 189. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 188, at 44. 
 190. See id. 
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parties in understanding one another’s positions and interests and 
assists in their consideration of possible outcomes to their dispute.191 
In a “transformative” approach, the third party neutral mediator is 
concerned with empowering the parties in dispute to relate to one 
another and address, perhaps not even resolve, their conflict so that 
they may continue to be in relationship with one another, realize their 
impact on one another, and communicate further in the future.192 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of mediation lies in the overly 
aggressive use of the evaluative approach that can border on mediator 
coercion pushing parties toward settlement, as discussed below.193 The 
transformative approach is probably the least understood and least 
knowingly employed. Hence, the facilitative approach, somewhat of a 
middle ground, would seem to offer a reasonable practice standard. 
Facilitative mediators are not as passive as transformative mediators, 
nor as proactive as evaluative mediators. 
2. Context 
In assessing mediation as an alternative to mandatory arbitration 
or civil litigation, we should be mindful of context in addition to 
approach. Mediation is conducted in myriad contexts. One major 
growth area for mediation is court itself. Perhaps the most often cited 
study of court-related mediation was conducted in Ohio nearly twenty 
years ago194 Wissler’s court-connected mediation data included 
roughly 1,000 civil cases assigned to mediation in Ohio state courts—
primarily during a settlement week program.195 Such settlement 
programs are common in many state courts and were instituted 
primarily in the attempt to clear court dockets.196 Similar to the 
author’s own experience of mediating for the state Superior Court in 
Rhode Island, 52% of the cases included in Wissler’s data were 
personal injury claims from automobile accidents.197 This is one 
particularly narrow application of mediation. In practice, personal 
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. at 109.  
 193. See infra Section III.B.  
 194. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: 
What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 644–
46 (2002) [hereinafter Court-Connected Mediation]; see also Roselle L. Wissler, 
Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical Research, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 419, 426–27 (2010) (discussing additional studies). 
 195. Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 194, at 645. 
 196. See id. at 668–71. 
 197. Id. at 652. 
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injury automobile accident suits are a voluminous niche involving 
many industry-specialist plaintiff counsel bringing such cases as well 
as a large industry of insurance defense counsel battling against and 
settling such claims. The work of a mediator in this milieu is heavily 
skewed toward inducing settlement.198 The mediator’s role in such 
cases is almost that of a broker shuttling offers between separate 
caucuses chiefly with plaintiff and defense counsel in an effort to settle 
cases while focused virtually exclusively on monetary damages, 
incented by courts pushing to get such cases off the docket.199 Direct 
communication between the parties, or even participation in joint 
sessions, in these situations is often minimal or entirely absent.200 
Yet, other versions of mediation can involve the most complex 
and high stakes conundrums involving many parties.201 Private 
commercial mediation often involves much more than reaching 
agreement on monetary damages.202 It can open disputes to creative 
solutions addressing underlying business challenges that have 
manifested themselves in almost proxy-like legal battles. Complex 
cases, very unlike automobile accident settlements, can expand 
resolution of a narrow legal dispute into enhanced relationships 
addressing underlying business interests. Mediator roles in these 
complex cases can facilitate direct party listening and brainstorming 
that go to the heart of mediation’s best qualities of flexibility and self-
determination. 
Studies on mediation can be misleading in that their context—
run-of-the-mill auto accident cases in court-connected mediation—
can often determine or limit their associated mediation process. That 
is, conducting a transformative mediation in a court-annexed auto 
accident case to many may seem counterintuitive.203 Indeed, whether 
 
 198. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: The 
“Problem” in Court Ordered Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 875 (2008) 
(discussing prevalence of settlements). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. at 875–76. 
 201. See Eric D. Green, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century: 
Re-examining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large, Complex Litigation: Lessons 
from Microsoft and Other Megacases, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1179–91 (2001) 
(describing a Microsoft mediation among others). 
 202. See id. at 1179 (discussing how private actions involving Microsoft 
related to money but also other commercial issues). 
 203. See Elad Finkelstein & Shahar Lifshitz, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Mediator: A Communitarian Theory of Post-Mediation Contracts, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 667, 674–76 (2010). But see Jody B. Miller, Mediating Commercial 
Cases in U.S. Municipal Courts: A Case for Transformative Mediation, 1 OPINO JURIS 
COMPARATIONE 1, 4 (2012) (“Transformative mediation is well suited for commercial 
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court-connected mediation is a positive or negative development is the 
subject of spirited debate.204 Again, tremendous pressure to settle often 
exists, and an intense cultural expectation of damages-focused 
caucused exchange underlies the court-connected setting.205 The 
reality of mediation is often determined by the distinctions between 
court-annexed mediation and private mediation206 
3. Developments in Mediation 
Regardless of its shortcomings, mediation is now intimately 
intertwined with the courts.207 Early mediation in the United States 
grew largely out of the urban social unrest of the 1960s.208 Early 
mediation’s combined address of labor and criminal law issues led to 
the formation of community mediation centers, the connection of 
those centers with the criminal justice system, and then direct 
 
cases since it affords parties a forum to move out of the negative, deconstructive 
experience that led to the escalation of the conflict, providing them with the ability to 
articulate the experience and its relation to the claim before the court. The idea that 
commercial cases are best addressed with a focus on the dollar amount 
misunderstands why cases make their way to court in the first place: because conflict 
has become negative and destructive, affecting the way the parties relate to one 
another, and leaving them few if any other options to resolve it.”). 
 204. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit or Breaking Free: The 
Relationship of Mediation to the Courts Over Four Decades, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
705, 706 (2008) (“[T]he current ambivalence about the relationship of mediation to 
the courts is only the latest phase of a four-decade-long tension in this ‘partnership’ 
of two very different dispute resolution processes. From the earliest beginnings of the 
‘modern mediation field’ in the late 1960s to the present, the relationship of mediation 
to the courts has fluctuated between two orientations. In the first, mediation has been 
seen and has served as a faithful ‘servant’ of the court system, performing functions 
vital to the courts and to effective judicial administration. In the second, mediation 
has been encouraged and has sought to ‘break free’ and establish itself as a separate 
and distinct conflict resolution process, performing very different functions that are 
vital to society but unrelated to judicial administration per se. The cycling between 
these two orientations is driven by the very different potentials mediation offers as a 
social process, as viewed through different professional eyes. These different views 
explain why some today are gratified by what they see as mediation’s success in 
finding a firm place in the court system, while others are discouraged by what they 
see as the court system ‘capturing’ mediation and depriving it of its real social 
value.”). 
 205. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 198, at 874–75 (discussing how 
mediation cases are resolved by lawyers who focus on damages). 
 206. See Rubinson, supra note 188, at 882–84. 
 207. See Bush, supra note 204, at 706 (offering a history of mediation with an 
emphasis on the tension the court-connection has on conceptions of mediation). 
 208. See id. at 709. 
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involvement with courts.209 Early family court (divorce) mediation 
programs have expanded and civil programs have grown—again often 
in attempts to clear dockets.210 These court-connected programs have 
been much criticized for their emphasis on settlement and their 
lawyer-focused process—much like settlement conferences.211 Again, 
they are generally seen as heavily influenced by evaluation, if not 
coercion, from mediators incented to resolve cases with settlements.212 
Yet, alternative applications of mediation have also grown. So, the 
tension between mediation as a relational, community-based process 
separate from the courts and the court-connected drive toward self-
determined settlement remains a challenge.  
4. Public Justice, Private Process 
A primary flaw in mediation shared with arbitration is its private, 
confidential nature, closed off from public review and visible public 
justice.213 Finkelstein and Lifshitz have sought to address this with the 
proposal of a communitarian approach to mediation that would put a 
court-affiliated mediator in position as a community representative in 
the mediation process.214 While this idea is a well-intentioned notion 
primarily meant to address concern for public justice, it raises a 
countervailing concern of converting mediation back into civil 
litigation or legalistic arbitration.215 Finkelstein and Lifshitz’ 
communitarian proposal would not only entail court approval of 
settlement contracts but the public disclosure of post-mediation 
contracts, which may or may not help to resolve the public-private 
tension.216 The communitarian proposal also relies heavily on notions 
of informed consent as a cornerstone of procedural justice intended to 
address social psychology research emphasizing the import of 
disputant perception of procedure as fair.217 Finkelstein and Lifshitz 
 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. at 717–20. 
 211. See id. at 731–33.  
 212. See id. 
 213. See Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2855–83. 
 214. See Finkelstein & Lifshitz, supra note 203, at 674–75. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. at 692–94. Contra Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of 
Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 64–65 (2004) (looking at the law’s coopting of 
mediation as analogous to the law’s prior coopting of equity). 
 217. See Finkelstein & Lifshitz, supra note 203, at 701; see also Jacqueline 
M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly 
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acknowledge that their proposal undermines the confidential nature of 
mediation yet deem the increased public review necessary and 
ultimately not worse than the disclosure consequences of post-
mediation contract litigation.218 
5. Procedural Justice and Fairness 
A paramount concern with any approach to mediation must be 
procedural justice.219 Nancy Welsh makes a strong case for the 
paramount import of procedural justice in court-annexed mediation, 
calling attention to the close connection to constitutional rights 
recognized in civil litigation.220 The role of lawyers in the process is a 
major factor in distinguishing court-annexed mediation from 
settlement conferences.221 Much of Welsh’s focus is on the sense of 
fairness that parties to mediation derive from the process—centering 
the existence of due process on the perception of the parties.222 Process 
control and participation are essential elements of fairness in 
mediation.223 
 
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 787–88 (1999) (fleshing out 
informed consent as the distinguishing feature of mediation); Lela P. Love & John W. 
Cooley, The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and Informed Consent: Warning 
the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 45, 50–51 (2000) (focusing on what 
mediators should tell disputants to fairly inform them in the mediation process). 
 218. Finkelstein & Lifshitz, supra note 203, at 708. 
 219. See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real 
Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 619 (2004) [hereinafter Looking Glass]; Nancy 
A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do 
With It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 817–19 (2001) [hereinafter Making Deals]; see also 
E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
129–30 (1988); John R. Allison, A Process Value Analysis of Decision-Maker Bias: 
The Case of Economic Conflicts of Interest, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 481, 488–89 (1995) 
(discussing constitutional and non-constitutional origins of process, though focused 
on bias). 
 220. See Making Deals, supra note 219, at 838–41. 
 221. See id. at 838–39, 843. 
 222. See id. at 818. 
 223. See Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of Fairness in 
Mediation, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 281, 284–85, 290 (2012) (“A careful reading of 
mediation literature and provisions in codes of conduct for mediators that refer to 
fairness considerations reveals two general meanings attached to fairness. First, a 
normative meaning of fairness, i.e., an understanding of fairness as a concept that 
describes a norm of behavior that ought to be followed; second, an understanding of 
fairness as a perception that describes an experience of fairness perceived by various 
people.”). 
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Welsh draws on significant work by social psychologists 
pointing to the importance of parties’ subjective perception of 
procedural fairness in dispute resolution.224 It is the sense that the 
process of dispute resolution is fair that matters in giving the 
disputants the sense that justice has been done, almost independent of 
outcome.225 Indeed, more than outcomes, procedure seems to 
determine disputants’ sense of justice and commensurate satisfaction 
with the method of dispute resolution.226 Note, however, that we 
should not conflate the perception of procedural fairness that Welsh 
refers to with the notion of normatively fair procedure in terms of 
accurate rule following.227  
Social psychologists assessing procedural justice and fairness of 
dispute resolution, Lind and Tyler, consider Levanthal’s theory of 
procedural justice which offers some objectively reasonable measures 
with which to judge qualitative fairness in dispute resolution.228 Those 
measures are the elements of consistency, bias suppression, accuracy 
of information, correctability, representativeness, and ethicality.229 
Lind and Tyler sort through numerous studies to arrive at a conclusion 
that disputants’ conception of fairness in dispute resolution is largely 
explained by the group value theory of procedural justice as opposed 
to the self-interested model.230 That is, people are more concerned with 
their treatment in the dispute resolution process as a function of their 
perception of its impact on their standing in society.231 How people 
perceive their treatment compared to others—the relational context—
may be determinative as to whether they feel a dispute resolution 
process has been fair.232 
Other factors that matter in disputants’ perception of fairness are 
the disputants’ sense that they have control over the process and that 
 
 224. See Looking Glass, supra note 219, at 619–20; see also LIND & TYLER, 
supra note 219, at 130. 
 225. See Looking Glass, supra note 219, at 629. 
 226. See id. (notwithstanding that several studies have indicated that 
Americans have a propensity to prefer adversarial dispute resolution, selecting 
arbitration as a first-choice method). 
 227. See Shapira, supra note 223, at 300–01 (“A perception and conception of 
procedural fairness are not necessarily the same for several reasons. One reason is that 
one could wrongly believe that he has been mistreated in violation of the rules even 
though this has not been the case.”). 
 228. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 219, at 131. 
 229. See id. at 131–32. 
 230. See id. at 230. 
 231. See id. at 237. 
 232. See id. at 230–40. 
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the process allows them to express themselves.233 Indeed these points 
are particularly salient to one favoring mediation as mediation’s 
essential volitional element and emphasis on being heard by and 
listening to opponents are so at the heart of the process.234 An 
additional benefit that this research calls attention to is post-conflict 
relations—which are generally more positive in the mediation context 
than in arbitration. Presumably, again, this is due at least in part to the 
volitional nature of any mediation outcome.235 Yet, Lind and Tyler call 
for much more research on this after effect, perhaps even more so 
because of contrary work emphasizing the public benefits of civil 
litigation in our constitutional system.236 
Further critiques of mediation point to flaws in its fundamental 
claim to self-determination.237 Horror stories of mediator bias and 
influence have been told.238 Indeed, ample litigation arising over failed 
mediation has been cataloged.239 Moreover, much of the relational 
benefit of mediation appears to have been lost in the growing 
propensity of mediators to forego joint sessions and conduct 
mediations as go-betweens for parties in exclusive caucus formats.240 
While much of the literature addressing disputants’ perception 
of fairness in dispute resolution focuses on participant perception, 
public perception matters also.241 This of course feeds back into the 
social justice critique shared with arbitration—the lack of public 
disclosure and reviewability.242 Yet, the very experience of mediation 
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302–04.  
 242. See Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2855–83; see also Robert A. 
Baruch Bush & Joseph A. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and 
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can be seen to have public externalities.243 In the transformative (party-
centered) approach to mediation, the very awareness of the interaction 
of the process is enhancing of civility and therefore productive of 
positive public externalities.244 Social justice refers to “achieving 
relative equality of conditions (not just opportunities) as between all 
groups or classes within the society.”245 Another version of the justice 
critique asks, “[I]s it sufficient . . . for the outcome to be acceptable to 
the parties or must those settlement terms match the requirements of 
some external standard of evaluation?”246 
Concern for fairness is so palpable that is shows up strongly in 
similar research in politics with implications for public policy 
formation.247 Again, the process, not simply the outcome, matters. 
6. Legalization and Lawyers 
The expansion of court-connected mediation and the associated 
legalization of mediation has been prominently critiqued. Jacqueline 
Nolan-Haley has called attention to the commonalities of mediation 
 
focuses on the ‘individuating’ nature of the mediation process, in which every case is 
handled on its own unique terms. The second type of critique focuses on the 
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formal rules and outside scrutiny.”). 
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process or other ADR processes.”). 
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CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 214, 227–28 (2005) (proposing, inter alia, six 
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with equity in her look back to Pound’s lament of the legalization of 
equity—the American folding of equity into the general body of civil 
litigation despite its separate origins.248 She finds a similar legalization 
of today’s versions of mediation.249 She notes mediation’s “capacity to 
reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, 
but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their 
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and 
dispositions toward one another.”250 In criticizing the increasingly 
legalistic quality of mediation, Nolan-Haley appears to emphasize 
fairness and individualized, self-determined justice as the heart and 
soul of mediation: 
The wholesale integration of mediation into our civil procedure points 
toward a de-facto merger of law and mediation. While less formal than the 
official merger of law and equity, it is nonetheless real. Perhaps more than 
any other ADR process, mediation has easily blended into the civil justice 
system and is greatly accepted.251  
Indeed, Nolan-Haley asserts that mediation has become the normal 
end to litigation.252 She describes the nature of court-connected 
mediation as both public and private.253 She advocates for separate and 
distinct mediation practice not so intertwined with civil litigation, 
calling for procedural justice through mediation that is not rule 
bound.254 Not surprisingly, as agreements in mediation have become 
less voluntary, resulting from more coercive mediators pushing for 
settlement, challenges to agreements have risen.255 
Nolan-Haley also has been critical of developments with 
mediation which she describes as moving mediation toward 
arbitration.256 She argues that increased involvement of lawyers and 
the resultant adversarial posturing, together with the expansion of the 
evaluative approach to mediation, are particularly demonstrative of 
this shift.257 She worries that as a consequence, the core mediation 
values of self-determination and individualized justice are being 
 
 248. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 216, at 62–65. 
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 250. Id. at 64 (quoting Lon Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971)). 
 251. See id. at 66. 
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 255. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 160, at 87–89. 
 256. See id. at 63. 
 257. See id.  
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corrupted.258 Indeed, in her survey of New York lawyer-mediators, 
Nolan-Haley found much to criticize about the influence of lawyers 
on mediation.259 She found that the lawyers have framed issues 
narrowly and legalistically, used adversarial tactics and inflammatory 
language, and employed other tactics not akin to party-focused self-
determination.260 Part of the problem she finds lies outside of lawyers 
in the adversarial nature of our very culture.261 
Similarly, Nancy Welsh proposes modifications of present 
versions of mediation to restore its essential elements of self-
determination and procedural justice.262 Much of Welsh’s remedy lies 
in the training of mediators to address bias, develop trust, and promote 
self-reflection and fairness in the process.263 Welsh draws on a 
collection of scholarly work to conclude that a fair dispute resolution 
process includes the opportunity for disputants to express themselves, 
demonstration that the decision makers have heard the disputants, 
objective neutrality in the forum, and dignified treatment.264 She notes 
that systems having these features can be shams and can be fraught 
with inequality of social status, resulting in skewed experiences, 
diminishing the voice of those with low social status.265 Perhaps 
controversially, Welsh supports others’ calls for mediators to take an 
active role in preventing unconscionable outcomes to mediation—
giving mediators a duty to censor and alter agreed-to outcomes.266 This 
references the also controversial concept of mediators serving as 
power balancers—knowingly and actively offsetting the resource-
laden and powerful party to give the resource-deprived and relatively 
less powerful party a stronger voice in the mediation process on the 
notion that this will more likely result in a fair outcome.267 
Yet, while scholars have criticized the role of lawyers in 
mediation and blamed them for turning mediation into arbitration or 
litigation, others have seen them as a more positive instrumental 
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resource.268 Jean Sternlight has noted that lawyer knowledge of 
processes and strategy in dispute resolution appears to be the most 
compelling benefit of counsel in a mediation context, though she 
points out additional benefits such as the skills of legal argument and 
information gathering.269 Sternlight makes the compelling point that it 
is those with the least resources who can benefit the most from lawyer 
representation in dispute resolution.270 Perhaps the greatest impact of 
Sternlight’s position derives from her assessing the mediation 
experience as it actually is and not as the ideal form it ought to be.271 
In its present form, she argues persuasively, mediation can benefit 
from lawyers’ skills.272 
7. Diversity of Dispute Resolution Practices 
Part of the challenge in assessing definitively what the 
challenges with current mediation practices are and how to modify and 
improve them to preempt or provide an alternative to mandatory 
arbitration is the very diversity of mediation practices, both court-
connected and otherwise.273 Thomas Stipanowich has referenced his 
work with Ian Macneil and Richard Speidel in finding much 
opportunity in contractual provisions for managing disputes, including 
mediation and arbitration.274 Stipanowich notes that some companies 
have found opportunities in implementing creative dispute resolution 
programs, holding open alternative dispute resolution processes 
beyond largely lawyer-driven mediation and arbitration.275 Diverse 
and innovative approaches to dispute resolution may include 
technology-enabled approaches, such as online communication and 
greatly enhanced data collection and access, and need not be limited 
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to narrow versions of mediation and arbitration.276 Stipanowich 
mentions a contrasting Chinese approach where adjudicator and 
mediator can switch hats, unlike most U.S. alternative dispute 
resolution models.277 Of course, such innovations raise the already-
existing criticism of med-arb that characterize such combinations as 
continued legalization of mediation, as discussed above.278  
Internationally, many see a trend toward mixed-mode dispute 
resolution, combining aspects of mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
as well as mixing the roles of neutrals and adjudicators.279 Such 
combinations involve variations on mediation attempts that if 
unsuccessful result in arbitration that may or may not be constrained 
by offers made in mediation.280 Stipanowich sets out a taxonomy of 
approaches to adjudication and evaluation in an attempt to create a 
definitive international lexicon for varied combinations and 
innovations of dispute resolution.281 He calls for further work by his 
task force to conduct a multiphase study of these approaches to 
develop international guides and best practices for an increasingly 
complex array of alternative dispute resolution structures.282 
B. Building the Mediation Alternative 
The preceding challenges to mediation are real but are not so 
damning as to impede the suggestion that some attempt at mediation 
is a better means of dispute resolution than pure reliance on mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration. Several of the flaws of arbitration are shared 
with mediation, most particularly the flaws of confidentiality, privacy, 
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and lack of public review or public conception of justice.283 Additional 
flaws with mediation include its creep toward arbitration and 
legalization—especially in court-connected contexts.284 Yet, even in 
the midst of all these flaws and criticisms, the winning attributes of 
self-determination, better actual and perceived procedural justice, and 
flexible, volitional resolution unconfined by rules-based adjudication 
make it the better approach—even when unsuccessful at reaching 
negotiated outcomes. Second steps that do not result in agreement-
resolving disputes can follow mediation.285 Attention to mediation’s 
challenges can help us to craft an alternative to mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration that best addresses these important concerns. 
Even if mediation does not satisfactorily solve the privatization 
of dispute resolution problem or the related public justice demand, it 
does in many of its forms offer an accessible, flexible means for 
parties in conflict to hear and be heard and to choose outcomes in a 
way that neither arbitration nor litigation in their rule-driven legalism 
make possible. Mediation is, at the very least, a best first attempt at 
resolving disputes. 
Mediation’s best hope is that it opens doors to full 
communication between parties in conflict, enabling them a fair, self-
driven process to determine their own mutually acceptable outcomes. 
When most successful, mediation leads to win-win solutions 
addressing underlying interests that otherwise might be cloaked in 
limited, adversarial legal issues and arguments. While the adjudicative 
processes of litigation and arbitration can at most resolve those 
adversarial legal issues and arguments, mediation can do much more.  
To some extent, mediation remains the wild west of dispute 
resolution. Yet, to harken back to the point Stipanowich makes, this is 
in part its value and appeal.286 If we are guided by best practices, why 
can we not experiment with creative contractual solutions to 
incorporate mediation as at least a first step in innovative, possibly 
combined, forms of dispute resolution to supplant mandatory 
arbitration? It is the most logical alternative to mandatory arbitration. 
Though imperfect, contractual mediation would offer low cost, speed, 
and simplicity, in addition to self-determination, flexibility, and 
fairness in process. It would mitigate against coercive entrapment in 
private adjudication decided by an unreviewed private judge and 
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would allow for subsequent versions of dispute resolution in the event 
that it resulted in impasse. 
A best version of the mediation alternative to mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration must account for the challenges discussed above. 
That is, a best version would first incorporate the promotion of a 
facilitative approach to mediation, alleviating concerns of coercion in 
too aggressive evaluative approaches.287 Second, a best version of the 
mediation alternative would allow experimentation with court-
connected and court-separated contractual arrangements.288 Third, the 
best version would allow for public awareness and education about 
mediation and create some component of public reviewability—
perhaps with heavily redacted public disclosure of post-mediation 
agreements.289 Fourth, a best version would require paramount 
attention to procedural fairness and the perception of procedural 
fairness both by disputants and the public.290 Fifth, the best version 
must attend to the role of lawyers in mediation and work, through 
training, to control their involvement so that parties have active and 
meaningful participation in the process, even as advised and benefited 
by lawyers’ experience, information providing, and advocacy skills.291 
Finally, the best mediation alternative (or at least precursor) to 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration should allow for innovation and 
resist constraint by existing and preceding forms of mediation and 
combinations of mediation with other forms of dispute resolution.292 
C. Volitional Mediation as a Best Practice 
It should be clear from Parts I and II of this work that the Court 
and the critics are at an impasse over mandatory arbitration and that 
alternative proposals are needed to move dispute resolution in the 
direction of greater fairness and justice, while still honoring the 
driving interests of simplicity and speed that first spurred the 
development of alternative dispute resolution in lieu of crowded civil 
court calendars, complex rules of procedure, and opaque lawyering.293 
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In addition to the constraints of arbitration and its increasingly 
litigation-like legalism, the Supreme Court’s effective refusal to 
recognize defenses to contractual mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
under Article 2 of the FAA leaves critiques of injustice, particularly 
toward individual employees, individual consumers, and individual 
investors, too credible and too disturbing to leave unheeded. Simply 
continuing to criticize (no matter how accurately and convincingly) 
the Supreme Court’s firmly established precedent enforcing myriad 
versions of mandatory arbitration is not enough. Promoting the 
contractual requirement of mediation as at least a first step alternative 
to arbitration is a plausible, constructive modification of dispute 
resolution. While mediation as at least a first step will not cure all the 
ills of dispute resolution, it offers substantially more hope of fairness 
and would directly counter the problem of forced arbitration with 
mediation’s inherently participatory process and volitional outcomes. 
From a consumer perspective, much of the concern over due 
process in dispute resolution lies in preventing or redressing the 
systemic injustice of large businesses controlling many relatively 
much less powerful employees, consumers, and investors through 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract clauses. This policy 
interest provides a compelling rationale for class action lawsuits or 
class action arbitration.294 Yet, present Supreme Court common law 
aggressively enforces mandatory pre-dispute class arbitration and 
general class waivers in relationships papered with adhesive contracts 
between large corporations and many uninformed employees, 
consumers, and investors.  
1. FINRA Model 
The discussion in Section III.B, above, suggests the key 
considerations to account for in building a mediation alternative to 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.295 To get a better sense of how this 
alternative could work and look, we might consider the existing 
FINRA model.296 A variation of the present FINRA model provides a 
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potential example for how a combined dispute resolution protocol 
including mediation as a first step might work.297 Though FINRA 
dispute resolution appears to focus on arbitration, FINRA actively 
promotes mediation to parties who file for arbitration and directs class 
claims to the civil courts. FINRA mediation can proceed either prior 
to or simultaneously with arbitration and results in the settlement of 
four out of five cases.298 
If we simply made a first attempt at mediation a contractual 
obligation for dispute resolution in employment, consumer finance, 
and investment contracts, we would provide a volitional opportunity 
for mutually agreed-to outcomes without the rules-based formality 
and legalization of arbitration or litigation.299 And, again, any outcome 
would be volitional, not the result of forced adjudication.300 
2. Italian Model 
One area of the world that has been embracing mediation is the 
European Union.301 EU Directive 2013/11/EU mandated EU member 
countries to create consumer alternative dispute resolution 
programs.302 Of course, a full survey of EU member countries on 
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mediation practices is far beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, a 
comprehensive look at one country is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, a cursory look at one country may be instructive. 
One of the most changeable of countries subject to EU directives 
on dispute resolution is Italy.303 With Legislative Decree no. 28/2010 
passed in response to European Directive 2008/52/EC for cross border 
mediation, Italy implemented a compulsory initial mediation session 
upon court filing for certain civil causes of action, then made it 
volitional, and then again made mandatory an initial mediation session 
(with mandatory lawyer assistance) for those causes of action in the 
span of under ten years.304 The Italian experience has shown greatest 
success in the mandatory initial mediation sessions resulting in 
volitional agreements to resolve disputes by mediation.305  
Another possible model for an alternative mediation approach 
might look like the Italian requirement of first session mediation for 
many civil claims—but in a manner less settlement driven than 
existing U.S. court-connected programs.306 These Italian mediations 
accounted for 90% of all mediations under the directive and showed 
an almost 50% success rate among them in reaching agreements 
resolving disputes.307 As a mandatory first session for certain civil 
claims has shown, on this model, volitional agreement resolving 
disputes would be likely to increase substantially and yield a 50% 
settlement rate.308 
Where mediation fails, second step arbitration or litigation might 
continue. Current U.S. court-connected mandatory mediation 
programs could be modified to better accommodate the challenges 
discussed in Section III.B above. Most particularly, less court-driven 
pressure toward settlement and more training of mediators in a 
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facilitative or transformative approach would help open the potential 
of mediation as at least a first step.309 
3. Best Practice 
Thus, this Article proposes that a best practice in dispute 
resolution is to contractually require a first attempt at mediation prior 
to any mandatory arbitration. This best practice would be an easily 
accepted modification for individuals and small businesses in each of 
the employment, consumer finance, and investment contract fields. 
Large businesses would be incentivized to adopt this best practice as 
a consumer-friendly marketing incentive. In the same way the 
sustainability promotion has an instrumental marketing benefit, 
publicly adopting first step mediation would offer big businesses 
consumer-friendly marketing, attracting business by reason of less 
coercive, more consumer-friendly first step mediation in the event of 
disputes. Large businesses might even fully fund mediation programs 
with independent third-party mediators. In the current parlance, 
offering this best practice is a nudge toward the volitional contractual 
inclusion of mediation as a first step in dispute resolution in 
employment, consumer finance, and investment contracts.310 There is 
ample reason to believe such a nudge can work.311 
A window into the plausibility of this best practice marketing 
incentive for business opened recently in the employment market for 
summer associates and first year attorneys.312 When a law professor or 
two called out law firms for requiring summer associates and first year 
associates to sign mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions (rather 
like the plaintiff(s) in Morris v. Ernst & Young,313 consolidated in the 
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Epic Systems case), law students also spoke up in protest, and the firms 
responded by dropping the policy. On this notion, promoting firm-
sponsored mediation programs and/or promoting the absence of 
mandatory arbitration agreements could advance a firm’s market 
position. 
Employers or businesses that promote a consumer-friendly best 
practice by offering mediation as at least a first step prior to mandatory 
arbitration can appeal to the marketplace and benefit instrumentally—
notwithstanding any normative imperative to cease mandatory 
arbitration, which imperative was clearly felt at large law firms 
wanting to recruit law school students and graduates. 
CONCLUSION 
Though this work does not offer a definitive prototype of a 
mediation alternative to mandatory arbitration, it does offer both the 
features to employ in this endeavor and the best practice of volitional 
contractual first step mediation. This is intended to advance dispute 
resolution models that put mediation first. It is, in effect, a call for 
further innovation in developing mediation as a first step contractual 
solution to the impasse of the Supreme Court’s hardened precedent 
enforcing mandatory arbitration and the scholarly criticism that the 
Court appears to have dismissed. Big businesses, step up to the nudge. 
  
